Losses, store closures, layoffs, and strategic contraction have become common news in the retail e-commerce sector this year, indicating an unfavorable outlook. According to the “2023 H1 China Fresh E-Commerce Market Data Report,” the growth rate of fresh e-commerce transactions in 2023 is expected to hit the lowest point in nine years, with an industry penetration rate of about 8.97%, vers le bas 12.75% année après année.
During market adjustments and competition, platforms like Dingdong Maicai and Hema Fresh, which still have some capacity, are actively taking measures to meet challenges and seek new growth opportunities. Some have halted expansion to focus on efficiency rather than scale, while others continue to enhance their cold chain logistics systems and delivery networks to actively capture market share.
It’s worth noting that despite the rapid growth phase the fresh retail industry has experienced, it is still plagued by high cold chain transportation and operating costs, significant losses, and frequent user complaints. For platforms like Dingdong Maicai and Hema Fresh to seek new growth and move forward, the journey will undoubtedly be challenging.
In the past, the rapid development of the internet led to the swift rise of the fresh e-commerce industry. Multiple startups and internet giants explored various models, driving the industry’s boom. Examples include the front-warehouse model represented by Dingdong Maicai and MissFresh, and the warehouse-store integration model represented by Hema and Yonghui. Even platform e-commerce players like JD, Tmall, and Pinduoduo made their presence felt.
Entrepreneurs, offline supermarkets, and internet e-commerce players flooded the fresh e-commerce track, creating a capital explosion and intense competition. Cependant, the intense “red ocean” competition eventually led to a collective collapse in the fresh e-commerce sector, bringing a harsh winter to the market.
Firstly, the early pursuit of scale by fresh e-commerce platforms led to continuous expansion, resulting in high operating costs and ongoing losses, posing significant profitability challenges. Statistics show that in the domestic fresh e-commerce sector, 88% of companies are losing money, with only 4% breaking even and a mere 1% making a profit.
Secondly, due to fierce market competition, high operating costs, and fluctuating market demand, many fresh e-commerce platforms have faced closures, layoffs, and exits. In the first half of 2023, Yonghui closed 29 supermarket stores, while Carrefour China shut down 33 stores from January to March, accounting for over one-fifth of its total stores.
Thirdly, most fresh e-commerce platforms have struggled to make a profit, leading investors to be more cautious about financing them. According to iiMedia Research, the number of investments and financings in the fresh e-commerce sector hit a new low in 2022, nearly reverting to 2013 levels. As of March 2023, there was only one investment event in China’s fresh e-commerce industry, with an investment amount of just 30 millions de RMB.
Fourthly, issues such as product quality, refunds, deliveries, order problems, and false promotions are common, leading to frequent complaints about fresh e-commerce services. According to “E-Commerce Complaint Platform,” the top types of complaints from fresh e-commerce users in 2022 were product quality (16.25%), refund issues (16.25%), and delivery problems (12.50%).
As a survivor of the fresh e-commerce subsidy wars, Dingdong Maicai’s performance has been unstable, leading it to adopt a strategy of significant retreats for survival.
Since 2022, Dingdong Maicai has gradually withdrawn from multiple cities, including Xiamen, Tianjin, Zhongshan, Zhuhai in Guangdong, Xuancheng and Chuzhou in Anhui, and Tangshan and Langfang in Hebei. Recently, it also exited the Sichuan-Chongqing market, shutting down stations in Chongqing and Chengdu, leaving it with only 25 city locations.
Dingdong Maicai’s official statement on the retreats cited cost reduction and efficiency improvement as reasons for adjusting its operations in Chongqing and Chengdu, pausing services in these areas while maintaining normal operations elsewhere. In essence, Dingdong Maicai’s retreats aim to reduce costs and improve efficiency.
From financial data, Dingdong Maicai’s cost-cutting strategy has shown some success, with initial profitability achieved. The financial report shows that Dingdong Maicai’s revenue for Q2 2023 was 4.8406 milliards de RMB, par rapport à 6.6344 billion RMB in the same period last year. The non-GAAP net profit was 7.5 millions de RMB, marking the third consecutive quarter of non-GAAP profitability.
Unlike Dingdong Maicai’s strategy of “cutting expenses,” Hema Fresh, which follows a warehouse-store integration model, continues to expand rapidly.
Firstly, Hema launched the “1-Hour Delivery” service to capture the instant delivery market, recruiting more couriers to improve delivery efficiency and fill the gaps in areas lacking fresh retail options. By optimizing logistics and supply chains, Hema extends its service capabilities to achieve rapid delivery and efficient inventory management, addressing the timeliness and efficiency shortcomings of fresh e-commerce. In March, Hema officially announced the launch of the “1-Hour Delivery” service and started a new round of courier recruitment.
Secondly, Hema is aggressively opening stores in first-tier cities, aiming to expand its territory while other fresh e-commerce platforms halt expansion. According to Hema, 30 new stores are planned to open in September, including 16 Hema Fresh stores, 3 Hema Mini stores, 9 Hema Outlet stores, 1 Hema Premier store, and 1 experience store at the Hangzhou Asian Games Media Center.
De plus, Hema has initiated its listing process. If successfully listed, it will obtain substantial funds for new projects, research and development, and market promotion to support business growth and scale expansion. In March, Alibaba announced its “1+6+N” reform, with the Cloud Intelligence Group splitting from Alibaba to independently move towards listing, and Hema initiating its listing plan, expected to be completed within 6-12 months. Cependant, recent media reports suggest that Alibaba will suspend Hema’s Hong Kong IPO plan, to which Hema responded with “no comment.”
Whether Hema can successfully list remains uncertain, but it already has a wide delivery coverage, a rich product range, and an efficient supply chain system, forming a sustainable business model with multiple quarters of profitability.
In conclusion, whether retreating to survive or attacking to thrive, platforms like Hema Fresh and Dingdong Maicai are consolidating their existing businesses while actively seeking new breakthroughs. They are expanding their strategies to find new “outlets” and diversify their food category tracks, transitioning into food e-commerce platforms with multiple brands. Cependant, whether these new ventures will flourish and support future growth remains to be seen.
